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Abstract
More and more users are suffering from email-based
phishing attacks over the past years. Despite the use of var-
ious technologies for anti-phishing, phishing is still one of
most serious attacks against Internet users. Email phishing
attacks fabricate the email’s origin. Unfortunately, current
email server systems can not authenticate the genuineness
of in-coming emails. In this paper, we present a novel anti-
phishing mechanism: Signed Email for Anti-Phishing (SE-
FAP), designed to automatically identify an email’s origin
to mitigate email phishing attacks. The SEFAP system is an
extendable secure cryptographic system that accommodates
multiple signature schemes. SEFAP can adopt any signa-
ture scheme which has two properties: Identity-based and
repudiability. Identity-based property removes the unrealis-
tic full PKI infrastructure deployment requirement and the
repudiability property protects sender’s privacy. We de-
scribe how to integrate the SEFAP system into a standard
SMTP server. We also proposed an efficient implementation
based on a novel ID-based ring signature scheme.
Keywords: Anti-Phishing, Malicious Email, Digital Sig-
nature.
1 Introduction
Email is an essential component of the Internet infras-
tructure. Email has become a vital part of our life with
its convenient and fast communication service. However,
email is not what it was designed to be. More than 75%
emails on the Internet are unsolicited emails such as Spam,
imposter email and so on [1]. Compared with Spam, phish-
ing email is a kind of malicious attacks to aim to steal per-
son’s private information such as bank account passwords.
Email has become an abused and powerful tool for imposter
to launch malicious attacks. The number of these attacks
and the cost caused by these attacks are increased each year
[3]. Email-based phishing attacks become more sophisti-
cated recently.
Email-based phishing attacks are one kind of malicious
imposter emails because the email origin of this kind of
emails is fraudulent. For instance, a phisher can eas-
ily launch an email phishing attack by sending an email
claimed from anyone he wants to impersonate because the
email server (SMTP: the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol [2])
never authenticates the reality of the email origin. In other
words, the sender’s real email address could not be the same
email address as it claimed in the “from field” of the email
header. The fraudulent sender’s email address and the offi-
cial looking email contents make the huge success of those
phishing attacks which waste the significant amount of hu-
man and machine resources.
Mechanism called MAUDE, Multiserver Authentic User
Detection, dealing with malicious imposter emails with at-
tachment, was explored in [4] in 2005. However, it de-
pends on the interaction between the incoming email server
and the outgoing email server. It also requires the email
servers have the established trust (i.e., sharing a common
secret), which requires the unrealistic, widespread common
key exchange and deployment. Mechanism, CAMEL (Con-
tAining Malicious Emails Locally), dealing with the ma-
licious imposter email including the case that the claimed
email senders could have been compromised by the adver-
sary, was explored in [6] in 2006. The mechanism was de-
signed to block outgoing malicious imposter emails to avoid
the malicious imposter email attacks. However, first, email
header (e.g., the From and Subject fields) can be forged
easily. Second, the adversary does not have to use Con-
tAining or MAUDE system to launch attacks since he can
easily build his own email server. Thus, both ContAining
and MAUDE can not block such kind of malicious imposter
email attacks.
The drawback of authentication with SMTP protocol is
partially responsible for philshing. In this work, we propose
a secure authenticated mechanism that allows the email ori-
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gin to be authenticated for mitigating phishing attacks. We
present our SEFAP system to provide the authentication of
sender. SEFAP is designed to deal with both signed and un-
signed email messages. Those email messages could come
from the imposter’s email servers which do not adopt any
SEFAP system. In the case of signed incoming email, SE-
FAP verifies the genuineness of sender and outputs true or
false to indicate email server’s action. In the case of un-
signed incoming email, SEFAP gives a warning to user and
indicates email server to put it into unidentifiable email box.
SEFAP consists of six system components. The first one is
dispatcher, which is an optimization algorithm to balance
the best time to verify the incoming emails. The second
is PKG, Private key Generator, generating email server do-
main system parameters and publishing public parameters.
The third is Extractor, generating its legal email user’s pri-
vate key and delivering it to its user within a secure channel.
The fourth is S-Generator, Signature Generator, generating
signature on the email content based on the selected signa-
ture scheme. The fifth is S-Verifier, Signature Verifier, veri-
fying the signature on the chosen signature scheme and out-
putting true or false. The sixth is system management mod-
ule to configure which signature scheme is adopted by the
email server. All of these components are integrated with
SMTP server, email server and clients. The SEFAP system
can adopt any signature scheme if it is identity-based and
have the property of repudiability.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we revisit current email systems. In Section 3, we
describe the SEFAP system and show how to integrate the
SEFAP system into a standard SMTP server. In Section 4,
we discuss some cryptographic primitives and describe an
efficient ID-based ring signature scheme, which can be ap-
plied to the SEFAP system. The final concluding remarks
are given in Section 5.
2 Email Model
A current email system network consists of multiple
email servers which have their own unique domain name.
Email servers and DNS (Domain Name Service) provide
convenient and efficient email service for users around the
world. Each email system transmits email messages based
on SMTP and provides web page client (Graphic User Inter-
face) for email user to manage his email including compose
new email, read incoming email, delete email and so on.
Each email uses a domain address and depends on trans-
lation service (DNS) to translate from domain name to IP
address. Outgoing email server sends email and incoming
email server receives email from other email servers.
We assume that an email message consists of three parts:
header (From field, To field, Subject, CC field, Reply field),
a non-attachment content and an attachment. The message,
which is signed, includes these three parts.
Definition 1 A phishing email is an email sent to a recipi-
ent R with (whitelistR, FilterR) such that
• Pr[sender(Email) ∈ whitelistR]=1, meaning that the
sender’s email address is on R’s whitelist. Thus, in the
original email system, no action has been taken at such
email.
• Pr[FilterR(Email)]=1, meaning that the non-
attachment content looks perfect and legitimate but
it’s actually impersonated.
3 The SEFAP Mechanism
The SEFAP system is an extendable, signature-based,
and secure email system. The SEFAP consists of three lay-
ers: presentation layer, business layer and database infor-
mation layer. Only the presentation layer is accessible by
users and the other two lower layers are protected and ac-
cessible to system administrators only.
SEFAP consists of SEFAP client, SEFAP server, and
database server which communicate through a secure chan-
nel. SEFAP authenticates the origin of incoming email and
takes appropriate actions to suspicious phishing email in
order to mitigate phishing attacks. SEFAP is designed to
adopt signature schemes. Since each original email server
already has its unique domain name on the Internet, do-
main level system parameters are designed to be generated
by the SEFAP server located in each physical email server.
The SEFAP server provides six sub-services: system man-
agement module, signature-scheme based parameters setup
module, private key extraction module, verification module,
synchronization module and dispatcher module. The sys-
tem management module specifies a signature scheme for
the current email server system. It can also add a new sig-
nature scheme into the SEFAP system and delete an old sig-
nature scheme from the SEFAP system. Thus, SEFAP can
be updated for a new signature scheme though uploading
the new signature-scheme component to the SEFAP system.
The signature-scheme-based parameter setup module gen-
erates domain system parameters under a selected scheme.
The private key extraction module generates its user’s pri-
vate key and delivers it to its user with a secure channel.
The verification module provides the signature verification
service even if the outgoing email server uses a different sig-
nature scheme from the incoming email server, and instructs
the email server to take appropriate actions to unidentified
emails. The synchronization module deals with the do-
main parameter synchronization operation and publication.
The dispatcher module provides the most efficient process
schedule to verify incoming email.
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The SEFAP client located at the sender’s machine is re-
sponsible for signing email when the user instructs the email
server to send an email message. The SEFAP client also
is in charge of system parameters license synchronization
including checking the parameter version, expiration, and
signature scheme identification using an efficient synchro-
nization algorithm.
3.1 The Protocol
The SEFAP system (Fig. 1) consists of system man-
agement, Private Key Generator (PKG), Extractor, S-
Generator, S-Verifier, synchronization and dispatcher. In
the initialization of the email system, the SEFAP Server
runs PKG for the system parameter generation, then pub-
lishes public parameters. It also calls Extractor to generate
the private key for each new email user after his registra-
tion has been approved by the email server. When a user
sends its outgoing email, SEFAP call S-Generator to sign
it. When a user requires to read its incoming email, SEFAP
implements S-Verifier and S-Verifier outputs true or false
which implies the action of the email server. If it is true,
SEFAP informs the email server to process the email as in
the original email system; otherwise, the email is suspended
and an appropriate action is taken (e.g., SEFAP blocks the
incoming email and sends a warning to the user).
SEFAP
Server
Setup Domain System Parameters
Extract Email User’s Secret Key
Sign Email






Figure 1. USE CASE OF SEFAP.
The SEFAP server is deployed on each email server and
the SEFAP client runs in a PC terminal. The SEFAP is
based on Identity-based signature schemes that consists of
the following algorithms.
• PKG: A private key generation algorithm, on input
a security parameter κ, Signature Scheme SN , gener-
ates email domain system parameters: public parame-
ters including the system public key, the system private
key S kept in SEFAP.
• Extractor: A user private key extract algorithm, on
input user’s ID, the public parameters W , the system
private key S, and the signing scheme SN , outputs
user’s private key SID.
• S-Generator, A PPT signature generation algorithm,
on input a message M , the private signing key SID,
and the signing scheme SN , outputs a signature σ.
• S-Verifier: A deterministic signature verification algo-
rithm, on input the message M , the system public pa-
rametersW , a signature σ, the user’s ID, the signature
scheme SN , outputs true or false.
Figure 1 shows a usage scenario of view for the SEFAP
system. It organized information collected during require-
ment elicitation into use-cases.
3.2 Information Flows
We show how a concrete implementation of the SEFAP
mechanism is integrated into a standard SMTP Server. Fig-
ure 2 emphasizes the control/information flow of the SEFAP
system. It describes the signing process flow. The function-
ality of the SEFAP Server is to setup system parameters, ex-
tract private key for each user, control verification payload
balance using connection pool and balance equalizer, ver-
ify each incoming email, and decide whether the response
action is to block incoming email or give a warning.






















Figure 2. SEFAP Outgoing Email Process
Methodology
An interpretation of the above outgoing email processes
scenario follows:
1. Alice requires to access her email account though
email client (e.g., web page email logging interface)
using her username/ password.
2. The email server verifies if Alice’s account and her
password are correct.
3. The email server takes an appropriate action and
replies to the email client.
4. The email client shows Alice’s personal email man-
agement interface if the account is correct, otherwise,
an error will be delivered to the email client.
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5. After composing message, Alice requests to send the
email.
6. The email client requests the SEFAP client to sign the
email and delivers the system parameters license to
SEFAP client.
7. The SEFAP client verifies if its system parameters li-
cense is expired. If so, the system parameter synchro-
nization is required and the SEFAP client downloads
system parameters from the SEFAP server and also up-
dates Alice’s private key certificate.
8. The SEFAP client generates the signature on the email
and delivers the signature back to the email Client.
9. The email client forwards the signature and message
pair to the email server.
10. The email server sends the signed outgoing email to
the destination incoming email server.
How to implement a verification process for the incom-
ing email is given in Figure 3. Also the verbal interpretation
























Figure 3. SEFAP Incoming Email Process
Methodology
In Figure 3, the incoming email process, the email server
consists of two components: email server monitor and email
database. We interpret the process as follows:
1. The email server receives incoming email.
2. The email server requests the SEFAP server to verify
the signature if the incoming email consists of a mes-
sage signature pair.
3. The SEFAP server chooses the corresponding verifica-
tion algorithm to verify message-signature pair under
the specified signature scheme. Then, it responds with
accept, reject, or unknown.
4. The email server takes an appropriate action to deal
with the incoming email and updates the record in the
database for the user identity of this incoming email.
5. Alice requests to access her email account though the
email client (e.g., the web page email logging inter-
face) using her username/ password.
6. The email server verifies if Alice’s account and her
password are correct.
7. The email client shows Alice’s personal email man-
agement interface if the account is correct, otherwise,
error page will be delivered to email client via browse.
8. Alice asks to read her email.
9. The email client requests the email server to extract the
email from the server.
10. The email server retrieves the email and its identity
verification status from the database.
11. The email server sends the result to the email client
The encrypted certificate including the private key is
generated by the SEFAP Server and securely delivered to its
email user, after his registration has been validated. Only its
legal email user knows and keeps his private key (that could
be stored a secure portable device). The SEFAP system pro-
vides the following security properties:
1. Password Exposure Free
Since the SEFAP server will authenticate the user
through the user’s private key, even if the user’s pass-
word has been revealed, attackers still can not access
user’s account. Thus, the malicious software such as
standard keyloggers, which can only capture user in-
put, can not compromise user’s account. This will pro-
tect user’s account from revealing the password.
2. Enhanced Privacy
The SEFAP system utilizes privacy-enhanced signa-
ture schemes. We require that the signature schemes
have ambiguity property. For example, we can make
use of the ring structure scheme consisting of sender
and recipient, where the recipient knows exactly the
signature is indeed signed by the sender; However, he
can not convince any third party that the email comes
from the sender since he might forge the email by him-
self. This therefore protects sender’s privacy.
3. Authentication
Most of email-based phishing attacks succeed in large
part because they fabricate the origin of email. Since a
repudiable signature can only be generated by sender
or receiver. When the recipient receives the signed
email, he can ensure the email’s origin since he has
not signed it. Thus, SEFAP can ensure the authenticity
of email’s origin.
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4. Unforgeability
In our ID-based ring signature scheme, given a valid
signature, the adversary can not generate a new valid
signature in polynomial time.
5. Non-interaction: Because the use of Identity-based
property, unrealistic and full deployment of Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) is no longer required.
4 Implementation: An ID-based Ring Signa-
ture Scheme for SEFAP
In this section, we show how to apply a ring signature
scheme to SEFAP. We describe our construction for an ID-
based Ring signature scheme, which could be applied to
the SEFAP system against malicious impostor mails such
as phishing attacks. Since the Identity-Based systems allow
a user’s Identity string such as email address as a public key,
the Identity-Based property eliminates PKI. Moreover, The
separable property in our ring signatures allows a sender
and a receiver possess independent domain system parame-
ters with the same signature scheme. Those two properties
make the deployment realistic. The advantage of two-party
ring signatures, where the signers of the ring only consists
of the sender and the recipient, is to make the signed email
have repudiability. We present our ID-Based ring signature
scheme using pairings.
4.1 Basic Concepts of Bilinear Pairings
Let G1,G2 be cyclic additive groups generated by
P1, P2, respectively, whose order are a prime q. Let GM
be a cyclic multiplicative group with the same order q. We
assume there is an isomorphism ψ : G2 → G1 such that
ψ(P2) = P1. Let ê : G1 × G2 → GM be a bilinear map-
ping with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: ê(aP, bQ) = ê(P,Q)ab for all P ∈
G1, Q ∈ G2, a, b,∈ Zq.
2. Non-degeneracy: There exists P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2 such
that ê(P,Q) = 1.
3. Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to
compute ê(P,Q) for all P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2.
For simplicity, hereafter, we set G1 = G2 and P1 = P2.
We note that our scheme can be easily modified for a gen-
eral case, when G1 = G2. Bilinear pairing instance gener-
ator is defined as a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm
IG that takes as input a security parameter  and returns a
uniformly random tuple param = (p,G1,GM , ê, P ) of bi-
linear parameters, including a prime number p of size , a
cyclic additive group G1 of order q, a multiplicative group
GM of order q, a bilinear map ê : G1 × G1 → GM and a
generator P of G1. For a group G of prime order, we denote
the set G∗ = G \ {O} where O is the identity element of
the group.
There exist a sender, Alice, a recipient, Bob, and TA
(Trustee, like SEFAP) in the system. TA executes the sys-
tem setup and user’s secret key generation. We assume that
all of participants have setup their public key setting, and
we donate by SIDs the secret key for the sender and by
SIDr the secret key for the receiver R. An ID-based Ring
signature scheme consists of four efficiently computable al-
gorithms:
• SET UP: Private Key Generator (PKG) takes as in-
put a security parameter  and generates a pair of mas-
ter secret key MSK and master public key MPK.
• EXT RACT : A deterministic algorithm that, on input
MSK and an identity string ID, outputs the trapdoor
information SID corresponding to the identity.
• SG: A probabilistic polynomial algorithm accepts
MPK, a set of identity string ID, a message m and a
random number r ∈ Z∗q , and outputs a signature σ(m).
• SV: A probabilistic polynomial algorithm takes input
a signature σ(m), a list of ID, and system parameters
and outputs either accept or reject.
In addition to the above main algorithms, we also require
the following,
• Unconditional Ambiguity. The adversary can not tell
the identity of the signer with a probability larger than
1/r, where r is the cardinality of the ring, even assum-
ing that he has unlimited computing resources.
• Unforgeability. The adversary can not generate addi-
tional signatures based on original signature.
4.2 Our Scheme
In this section, we present our concrete construction of
an ID-based Ring Signature scheme from the bilinear pair-
ings. SEFAP initiates SET UP and EXT RACT opera-
tions for system setup. After that, SEFAP executes SG for
outgoing emails and executes SV for incoming emails. Let
ê : G×G→ G2 be a bilinear mapping, where G be a GDH
group of prime order q. We assume i ∈ {0, 1} representing
either a sender or a receiver.
 SET UP: SEFAP runs PKG to generate and publish
global system params { Gi, ê, qi, κi, pi, Ppubi , h0,
h1 }, where h0 : {0, 1}∗ → G, h1 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq,
i ∈ {A,B}. A represents a sender domain system
and B represents a recipient domain system. Choose
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a random number si ∈ Z∗qi as the master secret key ,
keep si known by SEFAP itself, and sets Ppubi = siPi
as the master public key, which is published and could
be gotten using the synchronization operation.
 EXT RACT : Sender submits his identity information
IDs to SEFAP, then SEFAP runs Extractor to com-
pute QIDs = h0(IDs) ∈ Z∗q and returns his secret key
SIDs = (s+QIDs)
−1P ∈ G to the sender via a secure
channel. The receiver does the same.
 SG: Given a message m containing (email header,
subject, content and attachment), a set of identity
string IDs (Sender’s ID and Receiver’s ID), and Di =
ê(Pi, Pi) stored in SEFAP, SEFAP chooses a random
integer r ∈ Z∗q and does the following:
− Compute Ck+1 = h1((M)||ê(Pi, rPi)) ∈ Z∗qi ,
where i ∈ (0, 1), i = k, k denotes the sender, and
assumes that k = 1 and then gets Ck+1 = C0.
− Generate the forward ring sequence: pick T0 ∈
G, compute Ci+1 = h1((M)||ê(h0(IDi)Pi +
Ppubi , Ti)D
Ci
i ) ∈ Z∗qi , where i = 0
− Compute Tk = (rPk − CkPk)(s + QIDk)−1 =
(r − Ck)SIDk
The message-signature tuple is σ← {m,C0, T0, T1}.
 SV: To verify the signature, retrieve system parame-
ters Di = ê(Pi, Pi) from SEFAP for sender and re-
ceiver, and compute
Ci+1 = h1((M)||ê(h0(IDi)Pi + Ppubi , Ti)DCii ) for
i ∈ {0, 1}, Accept if C2 = C0.
Thus
C1 = h1((M)||ê(h0(ID0)P0 + Ppub0 , T0)DC00 ),
C2 = h1((M)||ê(h0(ID1)P1 + Ppub1 , T1)DC11 ).
 Correctness.
Tk = (rPk − CkPk)(s+QIDs)−1
= (r − Ck)SIDk .




The proposed ID-Based signature scheme satisfies the
properties of enhanced privacy, non-repudiation, unforge-
ability, and non-interaction.
In our scheme, we reduce pairing computation in each
ring node calculation compared with the one presented by
Fangguo Zhang and Kwangjo Kim[9]. Also our scheme
could be extended to multiple potential signers to construct
the ring for other systems. Because the ring sequence gen-
eration except the real singer ring node is the same during
SG and SV . Our method provides an alternative to other
signature-based methods (e.g., those using methods given
in [5], [7], [8]).
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